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Abstract 
This paper utilizes institutional features to identify the supply of labour directed towards 
individual enterprises. The labour market for Norwegian teachers is characterized by a high 
degree of central regulations. In the empirical period, the only variation in the wage level was 
determined centrally, and together with information on whether there is excess demand, this 
identifies the elasticity of labour supply. Using a sample selection model with fixed school 
effects, the estimated supply elasticity faced by the individual schools is close to unity and 
seems to be robust with respect to the model specification.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The shape of the supply curve directed towards individual firms is the core of the recent 
debate on the effects of minimum wages. If minimum wages have a positive effect on 
employment, the firms must face an upward sloping supply curve. But it is inherent 
difficulties in estimating the structural parameters of the labour supply function. In the 
minimum wage literature, reduced form equations are estimated, which may give some 
indication of the form of the supply curve. For example, Card and Krueger (1994) find that a 
19 percent increase in the minimum wage in New Jersey increased the employment in the 
fast-food restaurants by about 13 percent. If one assumes that the employment in all stores 
were on the supply curve both prior and after the minimum wage rise, the implied elasticity of 
labour supply towards this labour market area is about 0.7. The evidence in more recent 
studies of the minimum wage increase in New Jersey, however, indicates that the effect was 
close to zero, see Card and Krueger (2000) and Neumark and Wascher (2000). Boal and 
Ransom (1997) and Dickens et al. (1999) show that a minimum wage increase will have a 
nonlinear effect on employment in a monopsony market because more firms will be “demand 
constrained” as the minimum wage increases. Dickens et al. (1999) find an average elasticity 
of the minimum wage with respect to UK employment of about 0.3, but the elasticity seems to 
be above 2 in the industries with the lowest minimum wage. 
 
The first attempt to estimate the structural parameters of labour supply directed towards 
individual firms seems to be Nelson (1973). Using cross-section data, Nelson identifies the 
labour supply by utilization of a population density measure. Later studies argue that it is 
important to have data with a panel structure in order to control for unobserved factors as 
remote location and other potential sources of compensating differentials, see for example 
Sullivan (1989) and Boal (1995). Sullivan (1989) estimates the supply elasticity of nurses 
directed towards individual hospitals, and identifies shifts in demand by assuming an 
exogenous level of hospital caseload.1 Staiger et al. (1999) argue that the caseload was 
endogenous in the period studied by Sullivan (1989). The main problem with studies of this 
                                                 
1 The estimated elasticity of labor supply varies considerably between the different studies. Nelson (1973) finds 
large elasticities for most US states in 1929, with a national average of 19. In a study of coal mining in the first 
decades of the 20th century, Boal (1995) finds the labor supply elasticity to be in the range 1.9–6.8 in the short 
run and infinite in the long run. The supply elasticity of hospital nurses found by Sullivan (1989) is in the range 
1.3–3.8. 
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kind is that one typically does not have good instruments for wages. To identify the supply 
curve, it thus seems attractive to study specific institutional settings and experiments with 
exogenous wage changes. Staiger et al. (1999) claim that they identify the supply curve for 
nurses by a legislated increase in the wage level at Veteran Administration hospitals. 
However, their approach is not much different from the minimum wage studies and other 
studies of exogenous wage changes as Manning (1996). Staiger et al. (1999) argue that the 
employment of nurses is likely to be “supply constrained” because nearly continuous reports 
of shortages of nurses since World War II. Because this is aggregated information, one 
cannot, however, infer whether the actual adjustment is on the supply curve at all hospitals or 
whether this is the case only for a fraction of the hospitals. Their estimate of the supply 
elasticity of hospital nurses is around 0.1 and insignificant, in line with the main results in the 
minimum wage literature.2 
 
This paper utilizes a quasi–natural experiment with centralized wage determination and a 
distinct measure of labour supply in the Norwegian public-sector primary and lower 
secondary schools to estimate the school level elasticity of teacher supply. A clear–cut rule 
regarding the appointment of teachers makes it possible to identify teacher supply. According 
to the rule, the schools have to appoint the best-qualified applicant in a vacant teacher post. 
When it is impossible to get a certified teacher to a vacant teacher post, the schools must 
employ an individual without a teacher credential on a short-term contract. Thus, utilizing 
data on the number of certified and non-certified teachers, I observe whether there is excess 
demand for teachers at each individual school, and in the case of excess demand, the size of 
the teacher supply is given by the number of certified teachers.  
 
During a period of more than 40 years, the Norwegian teacher wages was solely decided by 
central wage bargaining. With one exception, the only sources of variation in the wage across 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that the exogenous wage increase of the individual Veteran Administration (VA) hospitals 
studied by Staiger et al. (1999) was related to the local relative wages of nurses. In 1991, the VA went from 
paying the nurses based on a national scale to a system where the nurses’ wages are based on local surveys. As a 
result, the wages rose in about two-thirds of the VA hospitals, while at the remaining hospitals, paying at the 
same level or above the surrounding hospitals, the wages did not change. By this rule, one would guess that the 
hospitals most likely to be demand constrained in their employment of nurses are not used to identify the effect 
of the wage change. However, variations in working conditions and workload may imply that the employment 
was demand constrained also in hospitals initially paying a lower wage than surrounding hospitals.  
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teachers have been teaching experience and the amount of formal education. The exception 
from this rule is the experiment utilized to identify the effect of wages on the supply. In three 
out of the 19 counties of the country, covering several local labour markets, teachers in 
individual schools with a high degree of teacher vacancies in the past get about 10 percent 
higher wage. Because the criteria to get the wage premium is teacher shortage of a certain 
extent (20–30 percent), excess teacher demand is also observed in a range of other schools 
both in the same geographical areas and in the rest of the country. 
 
The estimated supply elasticity in the present paper can be interpreted as a partial short run 
elasticity. It is a partial effect, or a first order effect, because schools and school districts 
cannot influence the wage level. With decentralized wage setting, the final effect is smaller in 
the case of wage spillovers. The estimated elasticity is a short run elasticity because at the 
large majority of the schools, the teachers receive a wage premium only in a limited time 
period. With expectations about a permanent wage premium, the response to a wage rise 
would be greater, and due to frictions in the labour market, more teachers may react on wage 
differentials in the medium run than in the short run. In addition, an increased average teacher 
wage would stimulate more students to undertake teacher education.  
 
The next section discusses the institutional setting more closely. Section 3 develops a supply 
function directed towards particular enterprises using a model that aggregates individual 
supply decisions. The empirical strategy and the data are discussed in the following sections, 
while the main empirical findings are reported in Section 6. I find a teacher supply elasticity 
close to unity. Several sensitivity tests are undertaken, and I also test whether the supply 
elasticity is heterogeneous. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. The quasi–natural experiment 
 
The wage determination of teachers is almost completely centralized with basically a common 
wage schedule at each school in several European countries as for example France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK. In Norway, the wage of an individual teacher was solely determined by 
 4
central wage bargaining up to the school year 2000–01.3 The wage varied across teachers only 
with respect to education level and teaching experience, but with one exception. This 
exception was teachers in schools located in one of the three northernmost counties in the 
country (out of a total of 19 counties) with particular recruitment problems. The eligible 
schools within these counties were selected by a criterion based on previous teacher shortage 
set by the central government, and the central government paid a wage premium of about 10 
percent. The school districts had no influence on which schools that were eligible of a higher 
wage and the selection had no financial implications for them. The details are described 
below. 
 
To evaluate the effect on teacher supply, the supply must be identified. When the wage is 
equal at each school (except the experimental schools), it is likely to be excess demand at 
some schools and excess supply at other schools. With excess demand, the employment of 
teachers with a teacher certificate, hereafter denoted qualified teachers, is given by the teacher 
supply. The appointment rule of teachers is crucial in this regard as discussed in 
Bonesrønning et al. (2003). First, the teachers are linked to the schools and not to the school 
district. Second, the school districts have to appoint the best-qualified applicant in a vacant 
teacher post. If at least one qualified teacher wants the vacant position, a qualified teacher will 
fill the post. A person without the required qualifications to be certified as a teacher, hereafter 
denoted a nonqualified teacher, can only be employed if no qualified teachers apply for a 
vacant teacher post. Nonqualified teachers can only be hired for one school year. The 
subsequent year, the school must make the vacant post public again in order to get qualified 
teachers to apply. According to the national contract, representatives of the teacher union 
must be informed prior to every hiring decision. In this way the union is able to closely 
monitor that the schools act in accordance with the rule, which have been one of the 
cornerstones in the teacher trade union policy. Thus, observed shortage of qualified teachers a 
particular year accordingly reflects the state of the teacher labour market that particular year, 
and since one observes whether there is excess demand, one can also observe for which 
schools the actual adjustment is on the supply curve. In that case, the supply is identified by 
the number of qualified teachers. 
 
                                                 
3 Some very limited local wage flexibility was introduced in 2001, and the wage setting will be further 
decentralized from 2004. 
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The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure compares two schools with equal teacher 
demand, but different teacher supply. Given the centrally determined wage W*, school 1 
(described by the teacher supply function TS1) has excess supply. The supply is greater than 
observed employment, and cannot be identified. The employment of qualified teachers at 
school 2 is determined by the size of the teacher supply, S2*, and the supply is identified. If 
teachers at school 2 are eligible to receive a higher wage, illustrated by W**, the teacher 
shortage is reduced if the supply curve is upward sloping as in the figure. Since the central 
government pay the wage rise, the teacher shortage is reduced from S*–S2* to S*–S2**. The 
excess demand can be eliminated if the wage rise is high or if the teacher supply is highly 
elastic. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The institutional setting described identifies the supply, and the quasi–natural experiment with 
exogenous determined wage variation identifies the effect of wages on the supply. The 
experiment includes several schools during the 1990s. Schools at which teachers have 
received a wage premium at least once will be denoted experimental schools. Table 1 presents 
the development for two stylized experimental schools. Three different systems to reduce 
teacher shortage have been in place during the empirical period. In 1993–94 to 1995–96, 
teachers in schools with more than 30 percent teacher shortage the past school year received a 
wage premium in nominal terms, which implies that the percentage wage premium varied 
with the initial wage. At mean, the wage premium was about 10 percent. For schools with 20–
30 percent teacher shortage in the past school year, the rules differed in different parts of the 
counties. In some parts the teacher wage premium was the same as for schools with more than 
30 percent teacher shortage, while in other schools the teacher wage premium was only half 
as large.4 Because it is previous teacher shortage that is the criterion for a higher wage, it is 
known well in advance of the school year which schools that will be eligible to pay a higher 
wage. This also implies that there is no direct causal effect of current supply on whether there 
is a wage premium. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
                                                 
4 The schools with the lowest wage premium are located in areas with a lower national income tax rate. 
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A new system took place in the school year 1996–97. Now only teachers in schools with more 
than 30 percent teacher shortage in the past school year were eligible for a higher wage. Thus, 
fewer schools had a wage premium in this period. This is illustrated by School A in Table 1. 
School A is included (IN) in first system in 1993–94 to 1995–96, but not included (NIN) in 
the second system in 1996–97 to 1997–98. Within the last system, continuing to the school 
year 2002–03, teachers in schools with more than 20 percent teacher shortage on average 
during the four last school years get a wage premium, where the wage premium is 
independent of region.5 
 
Since increased wage is expected to raise the supply, schools with teacher shortage marginally 
above the criterion for paying higher wage are expected to increase employment of qualified 
teachers such that the school is not eligible for a higher wage the next school year. This is 
illustrated by School B in Table 1. School B was an IN school in 1993–94, but not the 
following years. In this case, the teachers at the school in 1993–94 kept their wage premium 
as long as the system was in place, while new teachers at the school did not get the wage 
premium. In such semi–included (SIN) schools, only quits and not hires are expected to differ 
from other schools. When a new system starts up, and the school is still not eligible to be 
included in the system, none of the teachers receive the wage premium. Thus, if there is no 
serious teacher shortage at School B in 1994–95 to 1997–98, the school will be a SIN school 
in 1994–95 to 1995–96 and a NIN school in 1996–97 to 1997–98. 
 
To summarize, the experimental schools can be in three different states in a particular year; all 
teachers receive a wage premium, the incumbent teachers receive a wage premium, or none of 
the teachers receive a wage premium. Due to at least four different reasons, several schools 
shifted status during the empirical period. First, the requirement to be an IN school varies 
over time. Second, a higher wage is expected to increase the supply, and hence, may change 
the status for a school from IN to SIN. Third, other factors than the wage level influencing the 
supply may change, and finally, purely stochastic factors are likely to play a role at least in 
schools close to the criteria to be eligible to pay the teachers a wage premium. 
                                                 
5 Up to 1997–98, the teachers could choose between the wage premium described and one year of studies at a 
college with full pay. In the latter case, they had to commit themselves to work at the school the following five 
years. Those choosing College considered the benefit from a year of study to be larger than the wage premium. 
Thus, using the wage premium as the measure of the benefit of being employed at an IN school may 
underestimate the true benefit. 
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The systematic factors explaining why some schools have a low teacher supply can be hard to 
observe. The attractiveness with this experiment is that several schools shifted status. Then it 
is possible to investigate the within school variation in teacher supply and wage level in an 
analysis with fixed school effects capturing the major systematic factors important for low 
supply.  
 
 
3. An applied theory of labour supply 
 
This section develops a log–linear expression of the labour supply directed towards a school 
utilizing McFaddens (1974) random utility function approach and an assumption on the 
distribution of the individual utility functions that makes aggregation simple. Because the 
model does not include a particular institutional setting, the model can be regarded as 
describing the supply towards any types of enterprises. 
 
Assume that the well-behaved utility function of teacher b in the set of teachers B working at 
establishment e in the choice set E is b b b be eU U (C , H ;X )= , where C is consumption, H is 
hours worked, and Xe is a vector of characteristics of the enterprise (not necessarily a school 
because the teacher can work outside the school–sector). The budget constraint is simply 
written b beW H C= , where We is the wage level. Maximizing the utility with respect to Cb and 
Hb, subjected to the budget constraint, yields the traditional indirect utility function 
( )b be e eU v W , X= . Although deterministic for the individuals, the indirect utility function is 
assumed to be random from the observers’ point of view.   
( )b b be e e eu v W , X= + ε ,                                                                                                    (1) 
where εbe is an independent error term with mean zero.  
 
Each teacher wishes to work at the establishment supplying the highest utility. The probability 
that a teacher prefers to work at school i is 
( )b b bmaxi i ee EP P u u∈= = .                                                                                                                (2) 
If the stochastic part of the random utility function has an extreme value distribution, 
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( ) ( )b b ziP z v ( ) exp e−ε ≤ ⋅ = − , and that the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
holds, McFadden (1974, 1984) shows that (1) and (2) yields 
( )( )
( )( )( )
b
ib
i b
e
e E
exp v
P
exp v
∈
⋅= ⋅∑ .                                                                                                       (3) 
This is a model in which it is possible to identify the parameters of vb(⋅). 
 
The empirical counterpart to the supply directed towards a particular school, Si, is the sum of 
the probabilities that the individual teachers wish to work at school i times their preferred 
working time. 
( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
b
ib b* b*
i i i i b
b B b B e
e E
exp v
S P H H
exp v∈ ∈
∈
 ⋅ = =  ⋅  
∑ ∑ ∑ ,                                                                (4) 
where Hb* is the optimal hours worked. At this general form, the supply to the individual 
schools depends on characteristics of the individual teachers. A meaningful aggregation 
requires some assumptions on the distribution of the teacher utility functions. Denote the set 
of distinct different teacher types M, where M ≤ E. Assume that only one teacher type works 
in school i with more than an indefinite probability. Then (4) can be approximated by 
 
( )( )
( )( )( )
m
im*
i i m
b m e
e E
exp v
S H b
exp v∈
∈
⋅≈ ⋅∑ ∑ .                       (5)  
 
The supply directed to school i depends both on the wage level and other characteristics at 
this particular school and at other schools with type m teachers. Normalizing the supply to 
school i with the supply in another school with type m teachers, say school j, yields 
( )( )
( )( )
mm*
ii i
m* m
j j j
exp vS H
S H exp v
⋅= ⋅ ,                                                                                                         (6) 
By a similar procedure for all schools, the model can be written 
( ) ( ) ( )m m* m m* m m*i i i i j j j j i i i mln S v W , X ln H v W , X ln H ln S v W , X ln H = + − + − = + + δ  , (7) 
where ( )m m*m j j j jv W , X ln H ln S δ = − + −   is equal for all schools employing teachers of 
similar type.  
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Even though the observed utility level of being employed at school j is higher than at school i 
for teachers of type m, the model implies that some of those teachers will prefer to work at the 
latter school. This is for some random reason εb that is not observable. The aggregation 
procedure requires that the deterministic part the utility function of type m teachers is equal, 
but they may differ in tastes that are unobservable. Another interpretation is that frictions in 
the labour market hinder the employees to fully respond to utility differences. In models with 
costs of searching in the market, the employers have some monopsony power, see for 
example Mortensen (1986) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). In the present model, the 
error term εb may be interpreted as following from presence of searching costs or other 
transaction costs. 
 
Assuming that the relative risk aversion is equal to unity, 
( ) ( ) ( )i 11ln Xm m miU ln C e 1 H −γ−−β= α − − γ , where α, β and γ are parameters, (7) may be written 
i c m i x is w x= δ + δ +α +β ,                                                                                               (8)  
where small letters denote logarithmic values, 1x 1
+α
−γβ = β , and ( )( )1c 1 1 ln−γδ = −α α −α  is a 
constant term. Equation (8) is a simple log-linear estimable model with labour supply 
elasticity α > 0. It follows from the model that increased wage in school i has a positive effect 
on the supply of teachers because the school gets more attractive for teachers initially working 
at another school or outside the school-sector. With the chosen utility function, the optimal 
number of hours of work is independent of the wage level. 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
It is likely that whether or not a school is an experimental school is related to a large set of 
partly unobserved factors as location characteristics. In order to control for such time 
invariant variables, a model with fixed school effects is necessary. By partitioning the vector 
of school characteristics X into time invariant, school invariant, and time-school variant 
variables, (8) can be written 
* s*
it i t it x it its w x= δ + δ +α +β +η ,                                                                                       (9) 
where s*it is the true supply towards school i at time t, δt is time specific effects, δi is school 
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specific effects (including the parameter δm), the vector xit only includes variables with within 
school variation, and η is assumed to be a normally distributed i.i.d. error term.  
 
Teacher supply is only observed when there is excess demand for teachers, 
* *
it it it
it *
it it it
s if s d
s
d if s d ,
 <=  ≥
                                                                                                        (10)
where dit is the log of teacher demand. The model that applies to the observed sample is 
( ) ( )s* sit it it i t it x it it it it it
s
i t it x it it it
s s d 0 w x E s d 0
w x ,λ
 − < = δ + δ +α +β + η − < +η 
= δ + δ +α +β +β λ +η
                              (11) 
where λ is denoted the inverse Mills ratio, see Heckman (1979).  Because a large literature 
clearly indicates that local government income and population influences the demand for 
school expenditures, the selection process will not simply be captured by the constant terms 
of the model. 
 
The selection process can be identified utilizing that the demand behaviour differs from the 
determination of supply. Generally, the selection equation can be written (notice that all 
schools pay the same “out of pocket” wage for equal teachers) 
( )* z zit it it i t it x x it y it it i it itz d s w x y= − = µ +µ −α + ϕ −β +ϕ +η = µ + θϒ +η ,                      (12) 
where the ϕ’s are parameters in the demand equation. The sample selection is identified 
through the variables yit specific to the demand equation.  
 
In modelling demand for teachers, the institutional setting must be taken into account. The 
compulsory education in Norway is the responsibility of the local governments providing 
several other local public services as care of the elderly, pre–schools and different local 
utilities. The local governments have limited possibility to influence their income level. Due 
to central regulation, all local governments have the same income tax rate in a system of 
income revenue sharing. The second most important revenue is lump-sum grants from the 
central government. I will use the sum of these components as the exogenous local 
government income. The per capita income varies between local governments due to different 
size (and assumed economics of scale) and an active regional policy.  
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Different studies have found that the age composition of the population is important for the 
allocation of resources in multi–purpose authorities, see for example Borge and Rattsø (1995) 
and Poterba (1997). In addition, there may be congestion in the consumption of the local 
public services. Thus, the instruments used to identify the selection of schools into the state of 
excess demand are local government income per capita, the shares of pre–school children and 
elderly in the population, and population size. Because the model includes fixed school 
effects, the instruments are valid only to the extent that they can explain the different 
developments over time in the local governments. 
 
The selection rule is z*it > 0. Following Heckman (1979), the sample selection model can be 
estimated by estimating (13) in a first stage using a probit technique and calculate 
( ) ( )it i it i itλ = φ µ + θϒ Φ µ +θϒ       , where Φ(⋅) and φ(⋅) are the standard normal cumulative 
and marginal distribution functions, respectively. However, the incidental parameter problem, 
derived by Neyman and Scott (1948) and elaborated in for example Chamberlain (1984) and 
Lancaster (2000), implies that the maximum likelihood estimator of (13) is inconsistent. A 
fixed effects probit model is only asymptotically consistent in the time dimension because the 
fixed effects are not asymptotically independent of the other coefficients of the model. As a 
result, the fixed effects cannot be differenced out of the equation.  
 
Some recent papers have proposed different estimators of panel data selection models. Vella 
and Verbeek (1999) discuss a random effect approach. The selection equation can be 
estimated consistently by a probit model if the individual effects δi have a known distribution. 
This requires that the regressors are uncorrelated with the individual effects, probably not a 
valid assumption in the present case because the experimental schools are likely to have less 
favourable location than other schools. Kyriazidou (1997) discusses the case when the fixed 
effect selection equation is estimated in a consistent way, for example by a conditional logit 
model. In this case, non–censored observations for which it isϒ ϒ  can be used to estimate the 
supply equation consistently. In the present paper, the supply elasticity is identified by 
schools in which the teachers have a wage premium some years but not all years, implying 
that it isϒ ≠ ϒ . By the method proposed by Kyriazidou (1997), it will be hard to identify the 
supply elasticity. 
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The problem of estimating the selection equation can also be seen as a high dimensionality 
problem. When the fixed effects cannot be differenced out of the equation, the only way to 
estimate the model, although inconsistent, is to include dummy variables for each school. 
Because there is a large number of schools in the present data, this is merely intractable, a 
problem similar to the analysis of Abowd et al. (1999). Abowd et al. (1999) seek to estimate a 
wage equation including both fixed individual and fixed firm effects. While one set of fixed 
effects can be differenced out of the model, it is not possible to difference out two sets of 
fixed effects. They solve the econometric problem due to high dimensionality by imposing 
some orthogonality conditions, which make it possible to estimate some of the coefficients of 
the model consistently. The idea is to find some variables Z  such that 
( )( ) 0E I Z Z Z Z ′ ′ ′ϒ − ϒ =  . Utilizing the linearity of their model, the last fixed effects can 
be revealed in a second step estimation, which, however, is not possible in a nonlinear model. 
Instead I will here model the fixed effects. The fixed effects are approximated by 
i i iZ
µµ = µ +η .                                                                                                         (13) 
Sufficient conditions for unbiased estimators are zit iCov( , ) 0
µη η =  and that zit it iµη = η +η  is an 
i.i.d. error term. In the vector Z  I will include local government specific effects for local 
governments with more than 20 schools at average, dummy variables for the average number 
of schools, a full set of county dummies, three dummy variables for school type, the local 
government mean over the empirical period in the share of students at experimental schools, 
and a dummy variable for whether the school is an experimental school. With this 
specification, the number of observations to estimate the effect of each dummy variable is 
never below 100.  
 
With this approach, the variance–covariance matrix cannot be derived exactly as suggested by 
Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981) because the explanatory variables enter at level in the 
selection equation and can be considered as entering as deviation from school mean in the 
supply equation. The approximation to their matrix used is described in the Appendix.  
 
As time varying characteristics influencing teacher supply (x), I include school size measured 
as the logarithm of the number of students. In a sensitivity analysis, some other variables are 
included. 
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In addition to the occurrence of a wage premium, the mean wage level varies across schools 
because the mean teacher experience and amount of formal education vary. In the regressions 
below, three different specifications are used to identify the effect of the wage premium. First 
I simple use a dummy variable for experimental schools in which there is a wage premium. 
Second, I include the actual wage premium at the schools, which is independent of the basic 
wage and equal for all. Lastly, to estimate the supply elasticity directly, I use the percentage 
wage premium. The percentage wage premium is calculated based on information of the mean 
wage level of qualified teachers at each school. 
 
 
5. The data 
 
All Norwegian primary and lower secondary public–sector schools (first through tenth grade) 
are included in the sample,6 approximately 3300 schools in 435 local governments followed 
over the five school years 1995–96 to 1999–2000.7 The experimental schools are located in 
three counties consisting of 89 local governments. Experimental schools exist in 65 of these 
local governments, indicating that they are spread in many different local labour markets. It 
is, however, not straightforward to define the borders of labour markets. In the relevant 
counties, relatively few workers reside in another local government than their working place, 
indicating that the local governments are not too narrow measures of the local labour market.8 
Based on commuting statistics, Statistics Norway has classified 17 different labour markets 
areas in the relevant counties. There are experimental schools in all these areas, ranging from 
three to 48 percent of the schools. 
 
Table 2 shows the number of schools with a wage premium in the different school years.9 
Few schools were eligible of a higher wage during the relatively restrictive system in 1996–97 
to 1997–98, while about three times as many schools were included in the following years. 
The change in the criteria to be included in the system over time implies that most schools 
                                                 
6 Private schools exist to a very small degree. In 1995, only 0.5 percent of the students in the counties with 
experimental schools were enrolled at private schools. 
7 Employment data are not available before the school year 1995–96. 
8 In 1990, 85 percent of the workers in the relevant counties worked in the local government they resided. 
9 Schools with only one observation in the empirical period (new schools or closed schools) are excluded from 
the analysis because they yield no information in a fixed effect model. 
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only had a wage premium in a short period. Table 3 shows that out of the 139 experimental 
schools, teachers in 60 schools received a wage premium only in one year during the 
empirical period. As much as 35 schools have never been IN schools in the empirical period, 
they were SIN schools in 1995–96. 
 
Table 2 and 3 about here 
 
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics.10 The Norwegian school system is characterized 
by a large number of small schools due to scattered population, and the experimental schools 
are smaller than other schools. While the mean size of the experimental schools is 38 
students, the mean size of the other schools is 170 students. This is also reflected in smaller 
teacher supply measured in full–time equivalent employment of qualified teachers in the cases 
the supply is identified. I will perform a sensitivity analysis to investigate whether the 
empirical results are stable across school size. The income per capita of the local governments 
wherein experimental schools are located are higher than in other local governments, 
reflecting high grants to small and northern local governments. The average wage premium in 
the experimental schools is 920–NOK (about 100–USD) per month, or 4.2 percent. But since 
only 43 percent of the observations of experimental schools are IN– or SIN schools, the 
average wage premium for those schools is 9.6 percent. The wage premium ranges from 5.0 
percent to 12.2 percent, with the lowest and highest mean in 1997–98 (8.4 percent) and 1998–
99 (11.1 percent).  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Baseline results 
 
                                                 
10 Since I will use a logarithmic specification of the supply equation, schools with no qualified teachers (supply 
equal to zero) are excluded from the analysis. That is 8 and 9 observations of non–experimental schools and 
experimental schools, respectively. The model has also been estimated with the dependent variable at level. The 
estimated supply elasticity at mean values was similar to those reported below. 
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Table 5 presents the main results. Using a dummy variable approach (IN + SIN), I find that a 
wage premium increases teacher supply by 9 percent, and the effect is significant at 5 percent 
level. At mean percentage wage premium, the elasticity of teacher supply is equal to 0.94. 
Since the nominal wage premium is independent of the initial wage, the percentage wage 
premium differs across teachers. For newly educated teachers with the lowest qualifications, 
the percentage wage premium is largest. Using the centrally decided wage frame, the model 
implies that the supply elasticity is in the range 0.60–1.46.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Column (3) in Table 5 reports the result of the model using the actual wage premium as an 
explanatory variable. With this specification, the supply elasticity at mean is equal to 0.91. 
The model in column (4) estimates the supply elasticity directly by using the percentage wage 
premium at each school, which vary with the average experience and education level of the 
teachers. The estimated elasticity of 0.99 is close to the mean elasticities in the previous 
models. This is the baseline result undertaken several sensitivity tests below.  
 
The selection equation is reported in Appendix Table A1. The results are reasonable because 
variables that are expected to increase demand mainly have a positive effect on the probability 
of being IN or SIN school. To calculate the p–value of joint significance of the instruments, 
the selection equation includes school mean values of the instruments because identification is 
related only to within school variation. 
 
The elasticity of school size is 0.61, and is highly significant. Given school specific factors, 
the teachers seem to prefer large schools. The effect of the inverse Mills ratio is also highly 
significant, implying that the selection bias could be severe. 
 
I next ask whether the response to the wage premium differs between IN– and SIN schools. 
Since only the incumbent teachers receive a wage premium in SIN schools, one would expect 
the effect of the wage premium to be largest in IN–schools. However, if schools that change 
from IN to SIN are hit by a positive shock to a larger degree than other schools, I may find a 
larger elasticity for SIN schools due to a kind of selection bias. The model in column (5) in 
Table 5 indicates that the elasticity for SIN schools is larger than for IN schools, but the 
difference is clearly insignificant.  
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6.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Table 6 considers several different alternatives to the baseline model repeated in row (1). 
First, the result for the non–censored sample estimated by ordinary least square is reported. 
The estimated elasticity of 0.61 indicates that it is important to take sample selection into 
account. One would expect, however, that since the experimental schools have a serious 
teacher shortage problem at least one year, there is never real excess supply at these schools. 
The model in row (3) assumes that cases without observed excess demand at the experimental 
schools (22 percent of the observations), the supply equates the demand. Using OLS, the 
estimated supply elasticity is almost identical to the baseline model, indicating that the supply 
never markedly exceeds demand in experimental schools. Notice that the standard error of the 
supply elasticity is about three times smaller in the OLS regressions than in the two–step 
sample selection model, indicating that the upward bias of the standard errors in the two–step 
model compared to an efficient model may be quite large.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Is the results flavoured by the fact that school specific effects are not included in the selection 
equation? Row (4) in Table 6 reports the result when school specific effects for the 
experimental schools are included in the selection equation. The estimated elasticity increases 
somewhat, but only by one fourth of a (conservative) standard error. The result differs not 
much in two models with different shortcomings. The selection equation in the baseline 
model may have an omitted variable bias, while the estimators of the extended model are 
biased because the estimates of some variables are based on few observations. The model in 
row (5) includes a full set of local government fixed effects in the selection equation with no 
effect on the estimated elasticity. Excluding the number of students from the model neither 
has any marked impact. 
 
Rows (7)–(9) extend the model by including some new variables. Both the share of language 
and ethnic minority students and the share of students with special needs are shown to 
influence the teacher supply by Bonesrønning et al. (2003). They also show that the number 
of teacher education hours at the school, which may be important for teacher effort given the 
number of students, has a strong effect on teacher supply. However, including measures of the 
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student body composition or teacher effort in the model does not change the estimated supply 
elasticity, neither does a more flexible functional form of the number of students and teacher 
education hours.11 
 
Nonqualified teachers are utilized to a small degree in several schools. I have assumed that 
teacher supply is observable in such schools, but different kinds of noise may cause schools to 
employ nonqualified teachers even in cases without excess demand. To test whether such 
misclassification is a problem, row (10) in Table 6 assumes that the supply is only observed 
when nonqualified teachers account for at least one full–time equivalent teacher.12 Again, the 
elasticity changes very little. 
 
Lastly, I estimate the model for different sub–samples. When the sample is restricted to only 
the experimental schools, the supply elasticity increases, but by less than half of a standard 
error. Again the estimated elasticity is relatively independent of whether the selection 
equation includes school fixed effects or not. Are the results sensitive with respect to school 
size? This is an important question given that most of the experimental schools are small 
schools. The model in the last row of Table 6 restricts the sample to schools with more than 
60 students at average during the empirical period,13 but again the elasticity changes very 
little. A more thorough evaluation of the stability of the model is evident from the recursive 
estimates presented in Figure 2. The schools are sorted by the average number of students in a 
descending way, and initially, only schools with more than 130 students are included in the 
sample.14 Figure 2 shows how the estimated parameter changes when smaller schools are 
included in the sample successively. The estimated supply elasticity varies to some degree, 
but there is no evidence of different supply elasticity for the largest school, and the estimates 
are always within the 80 percent confidence interval of the baseline model. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
                                                 
11 Since the number of teacher education hours is the main determinant of teacher demand, this variable is not 
included in the selection equation. 
12 In this case, the share of censored observations increases from 0.22 to 0.56 for experimental schools and from 
0.48 to 0.76 for other schools. 
13 The number of observations falls with 28 percent, and the number of observations of experimental schools 
falls with 79 percent. 
14 In the initial sample, seven experimental schools are included. 
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6.3. Variation in the supply elasticity across school locations 
 
A classic example of labour monopsony is an isolated firm in a remote, sparsely populated 
area. In this case, the incumbent workers have high mobility costs and can accept a relatively 
low wage without quitting. If the firm wants to recruit new workers, the firm must pay the 
mobility costs of the new hires. Thus, remote firms are faced with a less elastic labour supply 
than other firms. In this section I perform crude tests on whether the teacher supply elasticity 
depends on the size of the local labour market or on whether teachers at neighbouring schools 
have a wage premium. The local governments are used as the local labour market in this 
section.  
 
First I consider to which extent new hires due to increased wage are recruited from other 
schools in the same local labour market. A simple examination is to estimate the effect of the 
weighted mean wage premium at the local government level, weighted by the number of 
students. A positive effect of the weighted mean percentage wage premium implies that some 
teachers are recruited from other local governments or from a job outside the school–sector. 
The result is presented in column (2) in Table 7. The elasticity of the mean wage premium is 
close to 0.5, and must be interpreted as the elasticity of teacher supply for local governments 
where all teachers receive the wage premium. Thus, given that the elasticity of the individual 
school is equal to unity at mean, half of the new hires seem to be teachers not previously 
working in a school in the same local government. This result must, however, be interpreted 
carefully because it is far from statistical significant.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
The effect of the mean wage premium captures both the increased supply at schools with 
wage premium and the decreased supply at neighbouring schools without a wage premium. 
The model in column (3) in Table 7 seeks to disentangle these effects by including the wage 
premium at the school level in the model. To interpret the results, consider a local government 
where half of the students are enrolled at schools in which the teachers receive a wage 
premium of 10 percent. Then the model implies that the supply increases by 8.5 percent in 
schools with a wage premium and decreases by 4.5 percent in schools without a wage 
premium. The supply at the local government level increases by 2 percent, which implies a 
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teacher supply elasticity of 0.4. The latter elasticity is independent of the share of the teachers 
with a wage premium, but is again highly insignificant.  
 
Lastly I investigate whether the supply elasticity depends on the size of the local labour 
market, measured by the number of students in the local government. I expect as Boal (1995) 
that the labour supply is less elastic in thin local labour markets. Column (4) in Table 7 
reports the results when the baseline model is extended with an interaction term between the 
percentage wage premium and the log of the number of students in the local government. The 
interaction term is positive as expected, although insignificant at conventional levels with the 
conservative standard errors estimated. Taking at face value, and using the sample variation in 
the number of students, the result implies that the supply elasticity varies from zero to 2.4, 
with a mean of 1.0. Small local governments seem to have greater problems with recruitment 
of new teachers than large local governments, which, however, also imply that they seem to 
have larger potential monopsony power.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Given the problem of identifying good instruments of labour demand, I have argued that 
utilization of experiments and institutional features is a fruitful way to establish evidence on 
the elasticity of labour supply directed towards individual enterprises. This paper develops a 
log–linear supply equation from a random utility function approach aggregating the individual 
choices to the enterprise level by assuming that all workers at a particular enterprise are 
observational identical. According to the model, the elasticity of labour supply is equal to the 
parameter determining the marginal utility of consumption. To estimate the elasticity of 
labour supply, I utilize a quasi–natural experiment in the Norwegian public–sector schools 
ensuring that the variation in wages across schools for identical teachers is solely determined 
by the central government. In addition, and in contrast to the existing literature, I am able to 
identify the enterprises with excess demand. In such enterprises, the size of the supply is 
equal to the actual employment. Using a sample selection model with fixed effects, the 
elasticity of labour supply is estimated to be close to unity. The results also indicate that the 
elasticity is largest in schools located in densely populated areas in which few other teachers 
have a wage premium. 
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While the estimated elasticity of labour supply is a structural parameter, one should be careful 
in interpreting the estimate as a behavioural parameter. The stylized theoretical model 
includes several critical assumption, where the most severe assumption in order to interpret 
the supply elasticity as a behavioural parameter is the aggregation rule. In addition, it is in 
general extremely difficult to disentangle the income and substitution effects, which in the 
present model are assumed to be of equal magnitude.  
 
The elasticity of labour supply estimated must be interpreted as a partial short run effect due 
to the particular experiment considered. In a situation of decentralized wage setting, wage 
spillovers would make the effect smaller. On the other hand, if frictions in the labour market 
are present, the supply is likely to be more elastic in the medium– and long run when workers 
can fully react to wage differentials. Regardless of the long run elasticity, however, upward 
sloping supply curves in the short run implies that some monopsony power exists in the hand 
of the enterprises. But the possible exploration of monopsony power in the short run must be 
balanced against long run considerations as discussed by Boal and Ransom (1997).  
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Appendix: The computation of the variance–covariance matrix. 
 
Rewrite the regression model (11) and the selection model (12) and (13) on compact forms, 
s
it s its = θ Ξ +η ,                                                                                     (A.1) 
( )* zit z it iz µ= θ Ψ + η +η ,                                                                                                 (A.2) 
where Ξ and Ψ are the explanatory variables (including λ and the fixed effects) and θs and θz 
are the parameters. Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981) derive the following approximately 
correct variance–covariance matrix. 
[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]s 1 12 2s ˆˆˆVar I Q− −η  ′ ′ ′θ = σ Ξ Ξ Ξ −ρ ∆ Ξ + Ξ Ξ  .                                                             (A.3) 
s
2ˆ ησ  is the variance of sitη , sˆˆ ˆλ ηρ = β σ , ( )2 ˆˆI −ρ ∆  is a diagonal matrix with ( )2 iˆˆ1−ρ δ  on the 
diagonal, 2it it it zˆ ˆ ˆ ˆδ = λ + λ ϒθ , 2 ˆ ˆˆQ    ′ ′= ρ Ξ ∆Ψ Σ Ψ ∆Ξ    , and Σ is the asymptotic covariance 
matrix of the probit coefficients. With a large number of units in a fixed effects model, the 
matrix ′Ξ Ξ  is intractable to estimate. Since differencing solves the problem for the supply 
equation, I difference both Ξ and Ψ in the Q-matrix to make it meaningful. The covariance 
matrix used in this paper is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )s s 1 12 2s ˆˆˆVar[ ] I Q− −η −η      ′ ′ ′θ = σ Ξ −Ξ Ξ −Ξ Ξ −Ξ −ρ ∆ Ξ −Ξ + Ξ −Ξ Ξ −Ξ                (A.4) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 ˆ ˆˆQ    ′′= ρ Ξ −Ξ ∆ Ψ −Ψ Σ Ψ −Ψ ∆ Ξ −Ξ      .                       (A.5) 
 
For small samples, it is possible to compare the proposed standard errors calculated from 
(A.4) with those calculated by the traditional approximation (A.3). As an illustration, consider 
the sample including only experimental schools, for which the supply elasticity is given in 
row (12) in Table 6. In this case, the standard errors of the traditional and proposed 
approximations are equal at the precision reported in the table. 
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Table 1. The possible states of the experimental schools 
School year School A School B 
1993–1994 IN IN 
1994–1995 IN SIN 
1995–1996 IN SIN 
1996–1997 NIN NIN 
1997–1998 NIN NIN 
1998–1999 IN IN 
1999–2000 IN SIN 
Note: IN denotes that all teachers at the school receive a wage premium, SIN denotes that only the incumbent 
teachers at the school receive a wage premium, while NIN denotes that none of the teachers receive a wage 
premium. 
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Table 2. The number of included experimental schools 
 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000 
IN 34 21 15 61 74 
SIN 61 0 16 0 15 
Note: IN denotes that all teachers at the school receive a wage premium and SIN denotes that only the incumbent 
teachers at the school receive a wage premium. 
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Table 3. The number of experimental schools in years of different states 
 0 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
IN 38 45 32 16 7 4 
SIN 57 79 5 1 0 0 
NIN 14 11 30 33 54 0 
IN + SIN 0 63 35 25 6 13 
Note: IN denotes that all teachers at the school receive a wage premium, SIN denotes that only the incumbent 
teachers at the school receive a wage premium, while NIN denotes that none of the teachers receive a wage 
premium. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics, mean values (standard deviation) 
Sample Non–experimental 
schools 
Experimental 
schools 
 IN and SIN 
schools 
Number of students 170.2 (130.6) 38.7 (40.4)  31.1 (37.8) 
Teacher supply in the cases of excess demand 15.6 (10.2) 5.2 (4.7)  4.5 (4.6) 
Local government income per capita1 16471 (4401) 24898 (6862)  25292 (6494) 
IN 0 0.297  0.692 
SIN 0 0.132  0.308 
Monthly wage premium1 0 900 (1085)  2095 (481) 
Percentage wage premium 0 0.041 (0.049)  0.096 (0.019) 
Observations 15230 673  289 
Proportion censored observations 0.475 0.217  0.242 
1 Measured in 1998–NOK. The exchange rate NOK/USD ≈ 9. 
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Table 5. Estimated labour supply elasticity. Dependent variable is the log of teacher supply 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(Number of students)  0.608 
(0.037)* 
 0.607 
(0.038)* 
 0.607 
(0.038)* 
 0.605 
(0.039)* 
(IN + SIN)  0.090 
(0.041)* 
- - - 
Monthly wage premium -  0.042 
(0.020)* 
- - 
(Percentage wage premium) * (IN + SIN) - -  0.993 
(0.439)* 
 0.919 
(0.472) 
(Percentage wage premium) * SIN - - -  0.372 
(0.764) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.425 
(0.132)* 
-0.440 
(0.138)* 
-0.436 
(0.136)* 
-0.446 
(0.138)* 
     
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Minimum elasticity  0.598  0.620 - - 
Mean elasticity   0.944  0.912 - - 
Maximum elasticity  1.463  1.053 - - 
     
Observations 15 903 15 903 15 903 15 903 
Non–censored observations   8 518   8 518   8 518   8 518 
Standard error of equation  0.14815  0.14821  0.14817  0.14813 
Test for joint significance of the instruments  
in the selection equation, p-value 
 0.010  0.012  0.012  0.009 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes significance at 5 percent level. The selection equation for the 
model in column (4) is reported in Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity analysis 
Model  Specification changes compared to 
the model in column (4) in Table 5 
Schools 
included 
 Elasticity 
(St. error) 
  Supply equation Selection equation    
(1)  None None All  0.993 (0.437)
(2)  None Irrelevant Censored observations 
excluded 
 0.574 (0.161)
(3)  None Excluded Censored observations 
of non-experimental 
schools excluded 
 1.005 (0.144)
(4)  None School specific effects for 
experimental schools included 
All  1.101 (0.306)
(5)  None Full set of local government 
specific effects included 
All  0.949 (0.369)
(6)  ln(Number of students) excluded ln(Number of students) excluded All  1.100 (0.577)
(7)  The share of students from ethnic 
minorities and the share of students 
with special needs included 
The share of students from ethnic 
minorities and the share of students 
with special needs included 
All  0.970 (0.402)
(8)  ln(Teacher education hours) 
included 
None All  0.979 (0.317)
(9)  ln(Number of students) and 
ln(Teacher education hours) 
included at squared, cubic and 
differenced form 
ln(Number of students) included at 
squared, cubic and  
differenced form 
All  1.001 (0.266)
(10)  Only observations with at least one 
full–time equivalent nonqualified 
teacher are regarded as non–
censored 
Only observations with at least one 
full–time equivalent nonqualified 
teacher are regarded as non–
censored 
All  1.036 (0.300)
(11)  None None Only experimental 
schools 
 1.165 (0.321)
(12)  None School fixed effects included Only experimental 
schools 
 1.097 (0.349)
(13)  None None Average no. of 
students > 60 
 1.000 (0.480)
Note: * denotes significance at 5 percent level.  
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Table 7. The supply elasticity and concentration of schools 
(1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
ln(Number of students)  0.604 
(0.038)* 
 0.605 
(0.039)* 
 0.604 
(0.039)* 
Percentage wage premium    -  1.304 
(0.509)* 
-1.761 
(2.303) 
Weighted mean percentage wage premium  
in the local government 
 0.529 
(0.982) 
-0.906 
(1.133) 
   - 
(Percentage wage premium) * ln(number of  
students in the local government) 
   -    -  0.461 
(0.371) 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.435 
(0.134)* 
-0.450 
(0.139)* 
-0.453 
(0.142)* 
    
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 15 903 15 903 15 903 
Uncensored observations   8 518   8 518   8 518 
Standard error of equation 0.14827 0.14787  0.14786 
Note: * denotes significance at 5 percent level.  
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Appendix Table A1. The selection equation, specification as column (4) in Table 5.  
 
Variable  
 Mean probability 
derivatives  
(standard error) 
ln(Local government income per capita)   0.216 (0.124) 
The local government mean during the empirical period in the variable above    0.191 (0.135) 
The share of the population between 0 and 6 years of age  -0.948 (1.796) 
The local government mean during the empirical period in the variable above   1.056 (1.921) 
The share of the population above 80 years of age   5.475 (2.865) 
The local government mean during the empirical period in the variable above  -7.170 (2.934)* 
ln(population size)   1.016 (0.335)* 
The local government mean during the empirical period in the variable above  -0.990 (0.335)* 
ln(Number of students)   0.095 (0.008)* 
Percentage wage premium  -0.786 (0.465) 
Experimental school   0.250 (0.027)* 
The local government mean during the empirical period in the share of the students at experimental 
schools 
  0.567 (0.161)* 
Students only at grades 1 to 7, and there are separate classes for each grade     - 
Students only grades 8 to 10, and there are separate classes for each grade  -0.000 (0.013) 
Students at all grade levels and there are separate classes for each grade   0.045 (0.015)* 
The school has at least one class that include students at different grade levels   0.021 (0.016) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 1,2      - 
Mean number of schools in local government is 2,3    0.042 (0.047) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 3,4    0.054 (0.045) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 4,5    0.025 (0.047) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 5,6    0.065 (0.047) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 6,7    0.031 (0.049) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 7,8    0.068 (0.048) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 8,9    0.109 (0.049)* 
Mean number of schools in local government is 9,10    0.068 (0.055) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 10,11    0.008 (0.055) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 11,12    0.014 (0.056) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 12,13   -0.061 (0.058) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 13,14    0.041 (0.059) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 14,15    0.104 (0.063) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 15,16   -0.162 (0.068)* 
Mean number of schools in local government is 16,17   -0.166 (0.066) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 17,18   -0.038 (0.063) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 18,19   -0.119 (0.067) 
Mean number of schools in local government is 19,20   -0.023 (0.070) 
Local government specific effects for local governments with at least 20 schools at mean   Yes 
Year specific effects   Yes 
County specific effects   Yes 
Observations   15 903 
Note: * denotes significance at 5 percent level.  
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Figure 1. Identification of teacher supply 
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Figure 2. Recursive estimates ± 2 standard errors of the model in column (4) in Table 5. The 
initial sample is schools with more than 130 students on average during the empirical period.   
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